A space–time analysis of the WikiLeaks Afghan War Diary: a resource for analyzing the conflict-health nexus by Andrew Curtis et al.
Curtis et al. Int J Health Geogr  (2015) 14:29 
DOI 10.1186/s12942-015-0022-8
METHODOLOGY
A space–time analysis of the WikiLeaks 
Afghan War Diary: a resource for analyzing  
the conflict-health nexus
Andrew Curtis1*, Xinyue Ye1, Kevin Hachey2, Margaret Bourdeaux3 and Alison Norris4
Abstract 
Background: Although it is widely acknowledged that areas of conflict are associated with a high health burden, 
from a geospatial perspective it is difficult to establish these patterns at fine scales because of a lack of data. The 
release of the “WikiLeaks” Afghan War Diary (AWD) provides an interesting opportunity to advance analysis and theory 
into this interrelationship.
Methods: This paper will apply two different space time analyses to identify patterns of improvised explosive devices 
(IED) detonations for the period of 2004 to 2009 in Afghanistan.
Results: There is considerable spatial and temporal heterogeneity in IED explosions, with concentrations often fol-
lowing transportation links. The results are framed in terms of a resource for subsequent analyses to other existing 
health research in Afghanistan. To facilitate this, in our discussion we present a Google Earth file of overlapping rates 
that can be distributed to any researcher interested in combining his/her fine scale health data with a similarly granu-
lar layer of violence.
Conclusion: The release of the AWD presents a previously unavailable opportunity to consider how spatially detailed 
data about violence can be incorporated into understanding, and predicting, health related spillover effects. The AWD 
can enrich previous research conducted on Afghanistan, and provide a justification for future “official” data sharing at 
appropriately fine scales.
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Background
There are many direct and indirect health impacts for 
those living in conflict zones [17]. Public health and 
epidemiological research has previously suggested that 
severe externalities (natural/human cause disasters as 
well as conflicts) cause or exacerbate negative health 
outcomes [11, 32, 38]. Yet this relationship is rarely spa-
tially studied in non-Western environments especially at 
local levels, primarily due to a lack of available fine scale 
data. One opportunity to address this gap has arisen with 
the release of “WikiLeaks,” and especially the Afghan 
War Diary (AWD) which offers 6 years of granular data 
in the form of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) loca-
tions, the weapon of choice for Taliban aligned forces 
in Afghanistan. These data can help enrich the existing 
body of health related research focused on Afghanistan, 
which though often makes reference to armed conflict, 
rarely incorporates actual violence data into their epide-
miological models [10]. The purpose of this paper is two-
fold: to consider the fine-scale space–time patterns of the 
AWD. Secondly, to suggest how these data can be used 
to conduct secondary epidemiological investigations of 
previously described studies. In so doing the following 
research question is posed to illustrate the need for gran-
ular data:
Is the pattern of violence in Afghanistan, as captured 
by IED detonations in the AWD, spatially and temporally 
homogenous at the sub-district scale?
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There have been multiple health-related studies focused 
on Afghanistan [22, 23, 27, 33], many of which also refer 
to the co-occurrence of violence [4]. However there are 
relatively few analyses of the nexus and when done usu-
ally conducted for broader aggregations such as the dis-
trict or province [24]. Although identifying patterns at 
broad geographic scales are still revealing, finer scale data 
that reflect day-to-day activity, individual settlements 
and especially transportation corridors are needed if we 
are to advance a spatial theory of how violence might dis-
rupt local health systems, lead to increased disease, and 
consequently how and where to target intervention.
There have been several spatially detailed studies of 
violence in Afghanistan and Iraq1 [3, 6, 7, 20, 21, 25, 39], 
though of relevance to this paper, is how there has been a 
lack of a standard reference conflict data source. Lacroix 
et  al. [20] use the Information Management System for 
Mine Action (IMSMA), while Benigni and Furrer ana-
lyzed IED locations from Iraq Significant Activities 
(SIGACTS) III [7]. Medina and colleagues drew from the 
US National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) World-
wide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), which although 
being a rich dataset of all attacks requires the researcher 
to use a gazetteer to geo-locate events [25]. Barker’s work 
on IEDs in Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan 
between 2002 and 2009 use kernel density estimation 
(KDE) to provide a detailed breakdown of violence across 
districts, showing how detonations had increased in 
number and lethality [6]. For this he synthesized three 
data sources (Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD), the National Counterterrorism Center’s World-
wide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) and Hazard 
Management Solution’s (HMS) TRITON Database), all of 
which contain information extracted from open source 
media, but again require the use of a gazetteer [6].
The WikiLeaks AWD offers an interesting alternative 
to these disparate sources, especially from a spatial per-
spective [39]. The AWD contains approximately 77,000 
events covering the period 2004–2009, including the pre-
cise spatial location of all Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs), the weapon of choice for insurgents in the region. 
Although NATO and other military forces have declined 
to confirm or deny the accuracy of these data, the New 
York Times, The Guardian, and Der Spiegel have all con-
cluded that these data appear to be genuine, a finding 
validated in academia by comparison with other data-
bases [39]. Though these data offer interesting possibili-
ties for the spatial analysis of violence in the region, they 
also present a previously unavailable opportunity for 
epidemiologists.
1 We include literature with regards Iraq due to the overlap in similar data 
input, techniques used, and general research context.
An example of why the conflict‑health nexus is important: 
Polio in Afghanistan
An example of a disease which has been linked to 
regional violence is Poliomyelitis [1, 19]. Poliomyelitis is 
a viral disease spread through the fecal contamination of 
food or water sources. In 1988 the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) proposed a strategy to combat the 400,000 
global cases per year and effectively eradicate paralytic 
polio by the year 2000. Regional initiatives were success-
fully implemented throughout the 1990s [26]. By 2006, 
endemic polio was only found in four countries: Nigeria, 
India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan [35]. Obstacles to vacci-
nation coverage, such as geographic barriers and relative 
cultural isolation, were overcome in India and Nigeria [5]. 
Disease reduction strategies in Pakistan and Afghanistan 
have not been as successful with the number of paralytic 
poliomyelitis cases actually rising in Afghanistan from a 
low of 4 in 2004 to a high of 80 in 2011 [30]; this despite 
WHO-UNICEF reported increases in the national vacci-
nation coverage rate from 35 % in 2001 to 66 % in 2011. 
A major reason for this lack of success is the ongoing 
violence in the region. By 2010, in the southern region 
of Afghanistan (Nimruz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul and 
Oruzgan provinces), which is frequently mentioned in 
news stories with regard its levels of violence; only 26 % 
of children were adequately vaccinated against polio.
Conflict hinders vaccine programs in numerous ways: by 
disrupting refrigerated transportation of vaccine stocks, 
increasing dangers associated with medical center loca-
tions, especially in more turbulent or isolated environ-
ments and due to the distrust, fear and uncertainty of 
being associated with any “official” program. For this 
region in particular, health workers have become targets 
themselves, subject to murder, threats and staff abductions 
[34]. We analyzed the polio-violence nexus in Afghanistan 
at a coarse geographic scale by regressing 2761 Coalition 
force deaths reported by iCasualties.org between 2001 and 
2011 against 264 laboratory-confirmed cases of acute flac-
cid paralysis caused by wild-type poliovirus. These case 
data originated from the World Health Organization’s 
(WHO) surveillance system which consists of a nation-
wide network of over 10,000 volunteers collecting acute 
flaccid paralysis counts, where in 80 % of cases lab work is 
used to identify wild-type poliovirus, vaccine-derived 
poliovirus, and related non-polio enteroviruses [36].2 The 
2 It should be remembered that surveillance data quality is often question-
able in conflict areas though it is suggested that as reporting exceeded the 
WHO expected incidence of 1–2 cases per 100,000 in every Afghan region 
it can be considered reliable. The reader should also remember that these 
data initially exist at a fine granularity but are aggregated to the District for 
reporting purposes. Although there are potentially near-real time safety 
consequences with releasing these data—it could be argued that after an 
agreed upon temporal buffer, researchers should be allowed access to this 
rich primary data source.
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regression results which incorporated various lag compo-
nents found a statistically significant pattern in the upward 
trends of both polio cases and coalition casualties. More 
specifically, for every unit increase in coalition casualties, 
polio cases increased by 0.129 2  years later (R2 =  0.802, 
p = 0.001).3 Or, an increase of approximately eight coali-
tion casualties was associated with one additional case of 
polio. This finding is in keeping with other research; in 
Somalia where outbreaks occurred in 2011 and 2013, and 
Syria in 2011 there had been an escalation in violence 
approximately 2 years prior [8, 15].
Unfortunately without access to these disease data 
(or vaccine data) at a fine scale, or maps of violence at 
an equal granularity, this is where previous polio analy-
ses in the region have stopped. Now, with the release of 
the AWD, we can perform more detailed analyses of the 
violence, leading to discussions with regards the spatial 
interaction between attack points, and immediately prox-
imate health outcomes.
Methods
The AWD contains multiple attributes, including the date of 
each event, the type of event (here we concentrate on IEDs), 
and latitude and longitude to eight decimal places. Text 
accompanying each record describes the number and type 
of causalities associated with the IED (civilian, coalition, or 
insurgent force death or injury), the time of the explosion, 
and other key features about the device. Although the num-
ber of casualties is available, we treat each IED event as a 
single entity. For our perspective this is a better measure of 
violence than casualties because the number of people in 
close proximity to the explosion is not reported. Thus there 
is no denominator to standardize this variable.4
Decisions have to be made with regards how to parti-
tion data in space and time for an analysis. For example, 
Benigni and Furrer [7] constrained their space time anal-
ysis of IEDs in Iraq to road segments, and to include a 
travel time variable from base to explosion as a distance 
measure, their decision in turn being influenced by the 
work of Lacroix et  al. [20] who found that 47  % of all 
ERWs were no further than 1 km from a road. The con-
cept of time is also important when considering violent 
attacks [7], not only because these events diffuse in space 
and time, but because key dates, policy changes, and 
even outside influence (such as importing IED “expertise” 
3 Unpublished research by the authors which acted as a conceptual precur-
sor to the work presented here.
4 It should be noted that the physical location of an IED is only one of sev-
eral possible attributes that can weight an event. For example, the number 
of deaths, injuries, or the mortality ratio. Others have found that there is 
less pattern with the number of mortalities as these to some degree are ran-
dom—although there is an association with the effectiveness of the device, 
but the unknown is how many potential victims are within range at the time 
of explosion [25].
from Iraq), can influence patterns [6]. When considering 
insurgent attacks in Iraq between 2004 and 2009, Medina 
et al. [25] noted the importance of specific dates, but also 
found temporal sequences or patterns within the larger 
time column, such as an increased likelihood of a second 
attack within 8  weeks of the first [9, 25, 29]. Given the 
likely importance of both space and time in the AWD, we 
chose two different methods to investigate the patterns of 
IEDs; KDE which is a frequently used analysis and SaTS-
can analysis.
Kernel density estimation
Kernel density estimation (KDE) is a commonly applied 
method to create “heat maps” in crime, epidemiological 
research [14, 16, 37], and other studies of violence in the 
region [2, 21]. All IEDs falling inside a kernel (a circu-
lar area extending away from a single location) become 
part of a density calculation. A quadratic function is 
used to reduce the influence of each IED as distance 
from the center of the kernel increases. Kernel size can 
dramatically change the final output map as the num-
ber of included IEDs varies; a small radius results in a 
more heterogeneous surface (at the extreme, each kernel 
only includes one IED), with more homogeneity occur-
ring across the map as the kernel extends outwards (at 
the other extreme all IEDs are included in a single ker-
nel). Although there are guidelines to suggest kernel size 
(the bandwidth), it is widely accepted that this is still a 
relatively arbitrary choice. However, understanding how 
varying kernel sizes can influence results is imperative 
[12, 18]. For the purpose of our analysis, and in order to 
give confidence in the stability of findings for any one 
bandwidth, several distances are chosen, though only the 
50 km radius is described here. This kernel size yields a 
reasonable compromise between fine and coarse scale 
smoothing; this distance also falls in the middle of a set of 
KDE examples chosen by Lacroix and authors in a previ-
ous study of Afghanistan [20]. The output of a KDE is a 
raster map with each cell containing an IED density value. 
These cells are contoured for visualization purposes.
The AWD can be sorted by year, season, month, day or 
even time of day.5 Although different temporal aggregations 
were explored, results presented here are for IEDs per year 
which is the easiest aggregation to match with other 
research. When comparing KDE heat maps across the years, 
each map was classified separately for the data distribution 
of that year which allows for the comparison of general spa-
tial patterns rather than intensities, even in years with lower 
numbers of IED explosions; in other words, the annual rela-
tive risk. As others have noted, the general trend in 
5 For example, Medina and colleagues used a temporal unit of 6 months in 
their analysis ibid.
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Afghanistan was an increase in IEDs of at least 40 % per year 
from 2002 to 2008, except for 2007. The largest single rise 
occurred in 2006 [6]. Therefore, applying the same class 
breaks would be problematic for years earlier in the 
sequence. The final output maps are classified into ten cate-
gories (approximating 10  % per color band) for each year. 
These classification breaks were used to determine our con-
tour granularity. For the purposes of this paper, only the top 
five classifications for each year (the top 50 %) are overlaid 
on a composite map of all IEDs. This approach to visualizing 
spatio-temporal data using a relatively simple analytical 
approach has previously been applied by the authors for 
space–time sequences in epidemic disease [14].6
Space–time disaggregation and SaTScan
KDE is a useful and easily applied technique to compare 
different time periods, though it is less useful at identifying 
temporal trends within the data. Alternatively SaTScan 
(v9.1.1) can reveal space and time patterns in locations col-
lected across multiple years [13, 14, 31] as it explicitly con-
siders spatial and temporal data point interconnections 
using a retrospective space–time permutation model with 
testing for statistical significance by a Monte Carlo simula-
tion (with 999 simulation runs). Conceptually, a tube with 
a set kernel moves across the study space, with the body of 
the tube shrinking or expanding at every location as it 
identifies clusters of events (in this case IEDs). Although 
different kernel sizes were chosen, results reported here 
are for a maximum of 50 % of the population at risk being 
included.7 Just as with KDE, a decision has to be made as 
to the granularity of the time column. We chose an analyti-
cal unit of a day in order to reveal patterns potentially 
missed by month or 6 month aggregations.8, 9
Results
Six KDE are applied to IED data extracted from the 
AWD, one for each year for the period 2004–2009.10 Each 
year’s KDE is classified into ten even breaks with only the 
6 It should be noted that others have chosen other more disaggregate clas-
sification schemes so as to limit artificial breaks and produce more visually 
appealing color transformations from high to low intensities on the map 
[20], though the type of classification applied here is the most common 
means of visualization.
7 Secondary clusters with geographic overlap were not considered.
8 Benigni and Furrer [7] suggested daily activity as an appropriate time 
frame because of diurnal patterns matching military operations, while Zam-
mit-Mangion et al. [39] used a weekly aggregation when analyzing the AWD 
data.
9 One consideration for fine temporal aggregations is the computing com-
plexity required for the analysis of such large datasets. Running SaTScan on 
daily data from the AWD took considerable desktop PC performance; over 
272 h on 8 processors.
10 Other temporal aggregations were also analyzed, some of which might be 
more relevant to different disease systems. Though for space considerations, 
only annual analyses are reported here.
top 50  % of the density map being displayed (as con-
tours). By overlapping the contours for all years, compos-
ite intensity maps are created and from these six 
“hotspot”11 regions are identified. For the purpose of 
reporting in Table 1 each hotspot is buffered outwards by 
approximately 10 miles in order to reduce the impact of 
imposing an artificial boundary on the data. All IEDs 
within this buffer boundary are counted for each year, 
with hotspot years being shown in red. The next three 
figures show the geographic overlay of all KDEs, along 
with the SaTScan result (described in a following sec-
tion), and the locations of all IEDs. Each annual KDE 
contour is displayed as a different color. In this way 
results can be visually compared across the years, with 
the underlying pattern of IEDs showing micro patterns of 
concentrations. Figure  1 shows Area 1 (Helmand Prov-
ince); what is immediately evident is that this area 
becomes more violent later in the time sequence, with 
IED hotspots being visible from 2007 to 2009. By com-
parison Area 2 in Fig. 2 (Kandahar) displays a consistent 
pattern of attack across the 6 year period, with the total 
number of IEDs also increasing each year. Area 3 in Fig. 3 
(Khost Province) also produces IED hotspots for every 
year except 2004, though the overall percentage rise in 
the total number of IEDs between the years is lower than 
for Areas 1 and 2. Areas 4 to 6 (not displayed) have less 
consistent patterns. Indeed, the number of IEDs in Area 
6 (Kunar Province) actually decreases in 2009.
The second space time analysis uses SaTScan to iden-
tify patterns of IEDs by day. There are six SaTScan clus-
ters which can be seen on the inset maps but only three 
of these are statistically significant (see Table  2 and the 
red circles in Figs. 1, 2, 3). Cluster “A”, the edge of which 
can be seen in Fig. 1 is the largest; Cluster “B” is the sec-
ond largest circle on the inset maps displayed on Fig. 4. 
Interestingly enough this cluster does not overlay with 
any of the KDE hotspots, and even the most proximate 
contours are for 2006 and 2007 to the northwest and 
2004 and 2007 to the southwest. Cluster “C” is shown 
in Fig. 3 along with two further non-significant SaTScan 
clusters. For all three of the SaTScan significant clusters 
the time component occurs within 2009. One interpreta-
tion could be even within the increasing trend of attacks, 
there was still a more strategized plan of attack for 2009. 
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 also illustrates the spatial heteroge-
neity of IEDs even within the hotspots. This is particularly 
evident along transportation routes and most easily seen in 
Figs. 2 and 4. Although not displayed on the maps to reduce 
clutter, there is also heterogeneity in IED patterns around 
settlements; there is a high intensity for some (seen as a 
11 We understand our use of the phrase “hotspot” is liberal and only 
denotes the areas of high concentration as identified by KDE. It is used 
more for ease of description than as a statistical expression.
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centralized intensity of IED points on Fig.  1 for example), 
whereas other settlements are more isolated both in terms 
of violence and transportation connectivity. Therefore, any 
health outcome reported by a District aggregation is likely 
to over count disease risk for more isolated settlements, and 
undercount risk in proximity to roads and violence “hot-
spot” settlements. This heterogeneity can be seen in Fig. 5 as 
spatially varying concentration of points within the shaded 
districts which are commonly identified as being violent. A 
boundary effect is also evident for both the KDE and SaTS-
can hotspots which cover multiple districts. These aggrega-
tion and boundary effects are well known to geographers, 
though it is not as a common to have access to a data set, 
usually because of confidentiality concerns, where these 
problems can so easily be visualized and disseminated.
Discussion
The release of the WikiLeaks AWD provides an interest-
ing opportunity for the analysis of violence in Afghani-
stan for the period 2004–2009. These data also offer 
a unique opportunity to analyze the conflict-health 
nexus. One example of where these data can contrib-
ute to a better understanding of this relationship is the 
impact on polio, particularly because of the challenges 
violence poses to regional vaccination schemes. Unfor-
tunately comparable fine scale polio surveillance data is 
hard to acquire, yet this does not stop us considering the 
likely impacts on vaccine delivery and disease based on 
the spatial patterns of IEDs. Consistent with other find-
ings [6] we found a general increase in IED attacks with 
each successive year but this trend is not geographically 
homogenous, and even declines in Area 6. From a health 
perspective, given the increasing intensity of violence in 
Area 1, if we accept that health is negatively associated 
with conflict, we would expect the disease burden to be 
worse in 2007–2009 compared to 2004–2006. Of course 
this relationship is actually more complex with differ-
ent temporal lags occurring with different diseases. If 
we accept our previously described finding of a 2  year 
lag between violence and an increase in polio then polio 
disease risk would extend to 2011. The situation in Area 
2 is even more problematic given the consistently high 
levels of violence. What our maps show, however, is the 
geographically focused nature of these attacks around 
transportation arteries. This might cause additional com-
plexity to the violence-health nexus as there is likely to 
be an impact on the mobility of health services, including 
vaccine deliveries, to areas not affected by the violence.
Although the results of the SaTScan analysis are inter-
esting from a space–time data analysis perspective, the 
selection of a fine temporal unit (1 day), in combination 
with increasing levels of violence in 2009 makes this a 
less appropriate approach for epidemiological compari-
son. Apart from the technique being harder to run, 
requiring programing skills to manipulate data for input 
into the model, and using considerably more computing 
power, the final results are not as revealing as the KDE. In 
particular the primary cluster covers multiple district 
areas, and is only relevant for 2009, even though we know 
there were other spatial patterns of violence across all the 
years. We acknowledge that these results might be due to 
a combination of the temporal aggregation chosen and 
the increase in IED intensity for 2009.12 Even though fur-
ther work is needed to look at how SaTScan should be 
best utilized on the AWD, we feel comfortable in suggest-
ing a KDE (or similar style) visualization of these data are 
the most useful if results are to be compared against 
other health data. This is important as most intermediate 
GIS analysts should feel comfortable in running such a 
technique.
We have shown that there is considerable IED geo-
graphic and temporal heterogeneity. The next question is 
how best to leverage these findings (and more impor-
tantly these data), into other epidemiological investiga-
tions. In this way we might be able to explore more 
spatially specific questions, such as does the distance 
decay function vary for different areas and diseases with 
regards a conflict-health relationship?13
As an example of how such subsequent research can 
develop, consider Brooker and colleagues work on 
endemic Plasmodium vivax malaria risk which incorpo-
rated a survey of 269 villages in 2005 supplemented 
with an additional survey of 333 villages between 2000 
and 2003 [10]. The authors mention the importance of 
violence, and in fact comment that the previous fall of 
the Taliban during 2001 had led to improved malaria 
control and delivery, but violence is not used as an input 
12 Further research needs to vary both the temporal aggregations and the 
bounded area being analyzed. In this regard, these data provide an excellent 
source to explore the limitations of this and other space time analyses.
13 This type of catastrophic event-health distance banding has been per-
formed in the United States, for example in association with the attacks in 
New York City on September 11th, 2001.
Table 1 Number of  IEDs falling in visibly determined KDE 
hotspots
Italic values indicate the total number of IEDs falling inside the area common to 
each year’s KDE highest contour when overlaid together
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Area 1 3 12 36 141 274 541
Area 2 18 32 99 143 242 504
Area 3 7 28 81 91 160 212
Area 4 2 7 30 31 15 30
Area 5 17 21 25 30 25 60
Area 6 16 17 25 25 27 21
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Fig. 1 KDE and SaTScan analyses of IEDs for Area 1 (Helmand Province)
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Fig. 2 KDE and SaTScan analyses of IEDs for Area 2 (Kandahar Province)
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Fig. 3 KDE and SaTScan analyses of IEDs for Area 3 (Khost Province)
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into their simulation models. By spatially overlaying 
their detailed publication maps with the hotspots gen-
erated from our KDE analysis, visual connections can 
be made as to why this might be a fruitful avenue of 
investigation. However, in order for subsequent 
research to be made more likely, it is important to 
release data and maps similar to our KDE output that 
are easily available. To this end we also conducted a spa-
tial filer analysis for two major areas of Afghanistan 
based on the overlay of all KDE results.14 For both areas 
a bounding box was created, and a grid overlaid inside 
in order to create a smoothed overlapping rate map of 
IED explosions. Three decisions were made in the calcu-
lation of this rate; the size of the filter (in this case 20 
miles though other radii were also analyzed), choosing 
the numerator as being all IED locations per year, and 
the denominator which were all IED locations for the 
entire period of 2004–2009. A modified version of 
DMAP [28] was used to calculate the spatial filter sur-
face. The resulting output, once manipulated into a GIS 
environment, is a grid of nodes where each location is 
the annual rate of IEDs within 20 miles. The benefit to 
other researchers is that once this rate map is overlaid 
with other spatial data, through a spatial join the proxi-
mate rate for any key location can be attached and then 
included in analyses. The second area (seen in the inset 
map of Fig.  6) spatial filter is relevant to the region of 
Afghanistan highlighted by Brooker and colleagues as 
having the highest incidence of malaria. Figure  6 also 
shows the IED KDE hotspot for 2004 and 2005; a com-
parable time frame with their village data collection. 
Finally, this figure also shows the spatial filter nodes for 
both 2004 and 2005 that generated an IED rate. In order 
to maximize the transferability of the IED map to other 
researchers, all spatial filters were exported into Google 
Earth. Figure  7 shows the outline of Kunar province 
which had the highest predicted probability (especially 
along the main road) of P. Vivax transmission based on 
Brooker and colleague’s logistic regression model. The 
14 Two areas were preferred that encompassed most of the IED events—a 
spatial filter grid for the entire country would not bare any more insight and 
would take considerably more computing effort for the type of fine scale fil-
ters we were applying.
associated spatial filter grids display the rate of IEDs 
(per 1000 IEDs) for 2004 (yellow), and 2005 (light blue) 
for this predicted area. Even from this graphic we can 
see the northeastern trend in violence, which becomes 
more pronounced in 2005. It would be easy to analyze 
the village surveys by spatially joining each to their clos-
est IED node.15  
Conclusion
Even though the release of the AWD generated consider-
able debate as to whether ethically researchers should use 
it, and concerns were raised that analyses could poten-
tially reveal military strategies that might impact cur-
rent operations [7], we believe a counter narrative is that 
conflict data such as these can help in predicting health 
outcomes, and should certainly be included in predictive 
modeling. Theoretical developments from such analyses 
are not only important in understanding the historical 
context, but also in helping explain how current ongoing 
conflict situations will affect the health of those in prox-
imity. Although one argument is the AWD represent only 
one location and for one time period, similar data are still 
being collected and we believe there is a health justifica-
tion to create a standardized fine scale release. This paper 
also suggests at the additional possibilities for research if 
more health data are collected, or made available, at finer 
spatial scales. Other countries report data (such as polio) 
at a far finer granularity than an Afghan District. It would 
be useful for the World Health Organization to address 
this issue of inconsistent data availability, even given the 
impediments occurring through the local political situa-
tion. Even without a standard release, we have shown a 
data resource that can be made available to researchers 
who have access to finer scale health data.
Although some of the previously described papers 
which have modeled explosive devices offer more insight 
with regards potential covariates than the relatively sim-
ple KDE and spatial filtering approaches described here, 
we see this paper as a first step. What we have done here 
is add a detailed spatial layer of a violence proxy that can 
be analyzed in conjunction with health data—even this 
relatively simple combination has previously not been 
available but rather left as anecdote or for the discussion 
section of a report or academic article.
At the time of writing, the situation in Syria and Iraq 
provide two country examples where such data could 
help improve our theoretical understanding, and could 
help shape intervention, response and political will.
15 The spatial filter grids are available from the authors as KMZ files at dif-
ferent spatial and temporal resolutions depending on the health situation to 
be analyzed. Please contact the lead author for details.
Table 2 Statistically significant space–time clusters identi-
fied using SaTScan
Cluster Radius (km) IEDs Time frame P value
A 132.79 668 2009/6/14 to 2009/12/31 1.00E−17
B 49.73 302 2009/3/21 to 2009/12/31 1.80E−13
C 8.56 27 2009/10/15 to 2009/12/31 0.0011
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Fig. 4 KDE and SaTScan analyses of IEDs around Cluster B
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Fig. 5 KDE and SaTScan IEDs results overlaid on Districts commonly associated as having high levels of violence
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Fig. 6 Spatial Filter of IED rates for 2004 and 2005 coinciding with a high risk of malaria
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